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Abstract 
For years, Germany has been a pioneer in the aggressive build out of intermittent 
renewables (solar and wind). The Energy Concept launched in 2010, in conjunction with 
previously established federal energy policies, has further enhanced Germany’s ability to reach 
lofty renewable generation targets via ratepayer surcharges that support feed-in tariffs. However, 
as the penetration of renewables has increased, wholesale electricity prices have demonstrated a 
steady decline. Through statistical and market-based analysis, this project 1) quantifies the price 
decrease that is caused by build out of renewables, 2) examines the market mechanics that result 
in a price decrease, and 3) evaluates the effect of the price decrease on relevant electricity market 
participants. 
Regression analysis indicates that average wholesale electricity prices will experience a 
decrease of 6.5 €/MWh – 8.5 €/MWh by 2020, solely due to the build out of renewable energy to 
comply with Energy Concept targets. Based on current electricity demand, this price reduction 
will result in an annual revenue loss of €2.96 billion – €3.88 billion. Importantly, this revenue 
loss will not be distributed equally amongst wholesale generators. Generators with higher 
marginal costs will be affected disproportionately because the frequency with which they can be 
dispatched profitably will decrease more than for cheaper generators. Specifically, this will hurt 
natural gas plants, many of which will be phased out due to unfavorable economics. This loss of 
natural gas plants will 1) present challenges to the grid’s ability to maintain stability while 
introducing more intermittent renewables and 2) force Germany to remain reliant on carbon-rich 
coal for electricity. The findings of this study are then applied to other locations that are also 
pursuing aggressive renewable energy targets. 
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Introduction 
For years, Germany has been a worldwide pioneer in the build out of renewable energy. 
On an annual basis, approximately one quarter of Germany’s electricity is produced by 
renewable energy sources (Federal Statistical Office of Germany, 2014; Germany.info, 2012). 
Germany’s build out of renewable energy has been primarily tied to the German Renewable 
Energy Act, which was implemented in 2000, and its 1991 predecessor, the Electricity Feed-In 
Act (Meza, 2013; Held et al., 2007). National policy has continued to incentivize the 
development of renewable power sources, particularly following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
plant incident in Japan, after which the Germans government has decided to phase out its nuclear 
reactors by 2022 (Post, 2011).  
Germany’s newest iteration of national energy policy was launched in 2010. The “Energy 
Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply” (hereafter 
referred to as the “Energy Concept”) serves as a long-term strategy with periodic goals extending 
through 2050 (BMU, 2010; GTAI, 2014). In addition to specific carve-out goals, the Energy 
Concept set a general target that 35% of Germany’s electricity must be supplied by renewable 
energy sources by 2020. This target subsequently increases to 80% by 2050. The Energy 
Concept, which uses market-based incentives such as feed in tariffs and tax credits, is financed 
through a combination of government spending and rate-payer surcharges (Germany.info, 2012). 
In order to reach the target of renewable energy sources supplying 35% of electricity by 
2020, the generation of renewables must increase by approximately 10% within the next 6 years. 
Conventional hydroelectric power, which currently supplies 3.2% of electricity, is relatively 
saturated in Germany – build out of turbines is now limited by the availability of suitable sites 
and the associated disruptions to local ecosystems (DENA, 2012). Energy policy such as the 
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Energy Concept has specifically pegged wind and solar (currently comprising 8.4% and 4.7% of 
total electricity, respectively) as the sources of growth toward renewable energy targets (Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany, 2014). The Energy Concept provides support for the build out of 
wind and solar by requiring grid operators to give priority to renewable energy. Also, ratepayers 
pay surcharges that are passed onto renewable energy generators via a feed-in tariff, which is a 
fee above the retail price of electricity. While the feed-in tariff varies depending on the type of 
renewable energy technology, the average surcharge to ratepayers is 0.036 €/kWh, which 
contributes to the extremely high retail electricity prices seen in Germany (Eurostat, 2013 and 
Germany.info, 2012). 
Unlike other sources of conventional and renewable energy, solar and wind provide 
intermittent power generation. Their generation capabilities are closely tied to environmental 
factors (e.g., wind speeds, solar insolation), so the contribution of both solar and wind generators 
to meeting demand is relatively hard to predict. This intermittent aspect of solar and wind, 
combined with the aggressive build out prescribed by the Energy Concept, has led to some 
concern about Germany’s ability to meet its renewable portfolio goals without compromising 
grid stability.  
Studies have indicated that recent events in the German electricity markets have been 
closely tied to this build out of intermittent renewables. One significant effect has been a steady 
decline in wholesale electricity prices. Average electricity prices have dropped from 80 €/MWh 
in 2008 to under 40 €/MWh in 2013 (Economist, 2013). These declining prices have coincided 
with the recent build out in renewables. Because the build out of renewables has been aggressive, 
the growth of total electricity production capacity within Germany has outpaced any increases in 
demand (Economist, 2013). Because the ratio of supply to demand has increased, economic 
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forces have driven wholesale electricity prices downward. Although wholesale prices have 
decreased by more than 50% in the last 5 years, retail electricity prices have exhibited a 
contrasting trend. 
Despite the steady reduction in wholesale electricity prices, savings have not been passed 
along to end consumers. Electricity consumers in Germany pay some of the highest electricity 
rates in the world. Second in Europe only to Denmark, retail electricity rates in Germany were 
0.292 €/kWh, which is about three times higher than the 0.117 $/kWh rate in the United States, 
after accounting for currency exchange (Eurostat, 2013; EIA, 2014a). Contributing to the 
discrepancy between wholesale prices and retail prices is the aforementioned ratepayer surcharge 
of about 0.036 €/kWh, which is paid by retail customers but is not received by wholesale 
generators (Germany.info, 2012). Instead, these surcharges are used to subsidize the feed-in 
tariffs that provide 20 years of guaranteed prices to renewable energy generators (Germany.info, 
2012).  
Other recent events indicative of the impact of renewables have been negative wholesale 
electricity prices. Negative intraday prices first occurred in 2007 and negative day-ahead prices 
were introduced in 2008 (EPEX, 2014a). Because grid operators must match electricity supply 
and demand in real time, negative prices are used to signal excess supply relative to demand 
(EPEX, 2014a). Therefore, individual generators are able to compare their internal economic 
tradeoffs that result from either paying money to generate electricity or incurring costs related to 
shutting down and coming back online. In 2013, electricity markets reached the negative price 
cap of 100 €/MWh set by the European Power Exchange (Economist, 2013; EPEX, 2014a). The 
increase in magnitude and frequency of negative electricity prices, coupled with the decrease in 
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average wholesale electricity prices, has led to concerns over the ability of wholesale electricity 
generators to operate profitably and continue to provide electricity necessary to grid stability.  
This Master’s Project examines the effect of an aggressive build out of intermittent 
renewables on Germany’s wholesale electricity market. The recent decline in wholesale 
electricity prices and numerous negative electricity price events have indicated that the build out 
of renewables has impacted electricity markets substantially in recent years (Economist, 2013). 
This analysis seeks to quantify further reductions in wholesale electricity price as a result of 
renewables built out via the Energy Concept. The effect of these price reductions on Germany’s 
wholesale electricity market will then enable predictions regarding the future of Germany’s 
electricity market.   
Methods 
 In order to evaluate the relative contribution and competitiveness of Germany’s 
electricity generators, a cumulative supply curve was constructed. The supply curve includes the 
four generators types that generated the most electricity in 2013 (coal, renewables [inclusive of 
wind, solar, and hydro], natural gas, and nuclear). Country-wide generation capacities for 2013 
were collected from a Fraunhofer Institute report (Fraunhofer Institute, 2013). Marginal cost data 
and generator-specific capacity factors for Germany were obtained from the International Energy 
Agency’s Projected Costs of Generating Electricity (IEA, 2010). Marginal costs were calculated 
by subtracting investment costs from total levelized costs of electricity (LCOE). Renewables 
were deemed to have a 0 €/MWh marginal cost to reflect the 0 €/MWh fuel cost and the fact that 
renewables are given dispatch priority by grid operators. To illustrate the impact of intermittent 
renewables on the cumulative supply curve, three curves were constructed. Using hourly 
generation datasets described below, the three curves represent Germany’s cumulative 
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generation supply when intermittent renewables were at their minimum activity, average activity, 
and maximum activity, based on total generation for a calendar day.  
 The interaction between observed wholesale electricity price and observed total 
generation (which is a proxy for total demand, excepting international electricity imports and 
exports) was evaluated to determine any significant trends that exist in the relationship between 
price and demand as the activity of intermittent renewables varies. Price data were obtained from 
the European Power Exchange (EPEX, 2014b). The selected dataset included hourly spot prices 
on the day-ahead wholesale market, for every hour in 2013. This dataset represented the most 
recent full calendar year, providing a sufficiently large sample set across all four seasons. The 
corresponding demand dataset was also representative of hourly demand for every hour in 2013 
(EEX, 2014). Summing hourly generation observed for conventional (> 100MW), wind, and 
solar generators in Germany was used as a proxy for nationwide demand (EEX, 2014). 
Contribution of renewables to total demand was calculated by adding generation from solar and 
wind and dividing that sum by total demand.  
 To quantify the relationship between generation from renewables and wholesale 
electricity prices, regressions were run using the aforementioned price and demand datasets 
(EPEX, 2014b; EEX, 2014). The first iteration was a linear regression using percentage of 
electricity generated by renewables to explain electricity price. The second iteration used the 
same explanatory and dependent variables, but included dummy variables to control for time of 
day (morning [7 a.m. – 10 a.m.], midday [11:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.], afternoon [2:00 p.m. – 5:00 
p.m.], evening [6:00 p.m. – 9:00 p.m.], night [10:00 p.m. – 6:00 a.m.]), season (spring [March, 
April, May], summer [June, July, August], fall [September, October, November], winter 
[December, January, February]), and day of week (weekend, weekday).  
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 Finally, to quantify the effect to total wholesale generator revenue, a normal distribution 
was fitted to a histogram of 2013 hourly electricity prices (EPEX, 2014b). The price distribution 
was then shifted according to the results from the regression analysis. To quantify the total 
revenue loss to the wholesale generator market, the area under the shifted normal distribution 
was subtracted from the area under the original normal distribution. The difference was then 
multiplied by annual demand (2013 demand was used to maintain a conservative estimate) to 
forecast the total loss in revenue resulting from an increase in generation supplied by renewables 
(EEX, 2014). The relative effect of this revenue loss on each generator type was evaluated by 
comparing generator-specific marginal costs to the original and shifted wholesale price 
probability distribution functions. This method allowed for the comparison of current and future 
dispatch likelihood for each type of generator. 
Results 
 The cumulative supply curve representing Germany’s hourly generation capacity 
demonstrates the differences between each electricity generator type in Germany’s portfolio. In 
order of ascending marginal cost, renewables are the cheapest source of electricity (0 €/MWh), 
followed by nuclear (12.3 €/MWh), coal (38.9 €/MWh), and natural gas (64.3 €/MWh) (Figure 
1; IEA, 2010). The effect of intermittent renewables explains the difference between the three 
curves. As the activity of intermittent renewables increases, the capacity of the renewables 
segment increases, which subsequently shifts out the total capacity of the supply curve.  
 Plotting hourly demand against wholesale electricity price reveals trends relating to the 
activity of intermittent renewables (EPEX, 2014b; EEX, 2014). For example, as the activity of 
renewables increases from generating <10% of electricity to >40% electricity, the price curve 
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shifts downward (Figure 2). This shift demonstrates that additional electricity generated by 
intermittent renewables decreases wholesale electricity price for any given amount of demand.  
Figure 1. Cumulative Supply Curve. 
 
In addition to the two series represented in Figure 2 (<10% renewables and >40% 
renewables), the intermediate range of generation from renewables (10% to 40%) follows the 
same trend. For each incremental increase in the amount of electricity supplied by renewables, 
the price curve shifts downward (Figure 3; EPEX, 2014b; EEX, 2014). 
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Figure 2. Wholesale Electricity Price vs. Hourly Demand. 
 
The occurrence of negative wholesale electricity prices also correlates with the activity of 
intermittent renewables. In 2013, the percentage of hours with negative wholesale electricity 
prices increased as the amount of electricity from intermittent renewables increased: 0.00% of 
hours with <10% renewables; 0.00% of hours with 10% to <20% renewables; 0.25% of hours 
with 20% to <30% renewables; 0.82% of hours with 30% to <40% renewables; and 14.57% of 
hours with ≥40% renewables. In line with these two trends associated with increasing activity 
from intermittent renewables (downward price shift and increase in negative prices), the 
magnitude of negative prices increases as well. The average of the negative hourly prices for 
20% to <30% renewables is -0.97 €/MWh. For 30% to <40% renewables, the average is -1.24 
€/MWh. For ≥40% renewables, the average is -17.17 €/MWh. 
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Figure 3. Wholesale Electricity Price vs. Hourly Demand for Every Hour in 2013. 
 
 Two regressions were run in order to quantify the impact of the percentage of electricity 
supplied by renewables on wholesale electricity price (EPEX, 2014b; EEX, 2014). In the case of 
the simple regression, the explanatory variable, “percentage of generation provided by 
renewables,” explained 21% of the trend observed in price (adjusted R2 = 0.215) (Figure 4). The 
intercept and explanatory variable coefficient were highly statistically significant (p < 0.001; p 
<0.001, respectively) (Table 1). This regression indicated that a 10% increase in the amount of 
electricity supplied by renewables will yield a decrease in average wholesale electricity price of 
6.5 €/MWh.  
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Figure 4. Percentage of Generation Provided by Renewables vs. Wholesale Electricity 
Price. 
 
Table 1. Simple Regression Summary (Renewables vs. Price). 
 
 To expand upon the simple regression, a second regression was run that included 8 
dummy variables (EPEX, 2014b; EEX, 2014). The dummy variables were used to control for 
any trends in electricity price that resulted from season, time of day, or day of the week. In this 
multiple regression, the same explanatory variable, “percentage of generation provided by 
renewables,” explained 65% of the trend observed in price (adjusted R2 = 0.649). Again, the 
renewables explanatory variable coefficient was highly statistically significant (p < 0.001), as 
were the intercept and the coefficient for all dummy variables (Table 2). This regression 
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Regression Statistics:    Simple Regression for Price    (1 variable, n=8760)
R-S quared Adj.RS qr S td.E rr.Reg. #  Cases #  M issingt(2.50%,8758) Conf . level
0.215 0.215 14.589 8760 0 1.960 95.0%
V ariable Coeff icient S td.E rr. t-S tat. P -value
Intercept 48.501 0.269 180.369 0.000
Renewables -65.254 1.333 -48.940 0.000
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indicated that a 10% increase in the amount of electricity supplied by renewables will yield a 
decrease in average electricity price of 8.5 €/MWh. 
Table 2. Multiple Regression Summary (Renewables vs. Price). 
 
To quantify the effect of a price shift on wholesale generators, the price probability 
distribution function (PDF) that was fitted to a histogram of 2013 electricity prices (Figure 5) 
was then shifted downward to represent the effect of increasing from 25% to 35% renewables 
(EPEX, 2014b). Shifts of 8.5 €/MWh (best guess scenario) and 6.5 €/MWh (conservative 
scenario) were compared to the current scenario (Figure 6). By subtracting the area under the 
shifted curve from the area under the current scenario curve and multiplying by current annual 
demand (456 TWh), the estimated annual revenue loss ranges from €2.96 billion for the 
conservative scenario to €3.88 billion for the best guess scenario (EEX, 2014). These figures 
represent a loss in annual revenue ranging from 17.7% to 23.2%, respectively (EPEX, 2014b; 
EEX, 2014).  
Regression Statistics:    Multiple Regression for Price    (9 variables, n=8760)
R-S quared Adj.RS qr S td.E rr.Reg. #  Cases #  M issingt(2.50%,8750) Conf . level
0.650 0.649 9.751 8760 0 1.960 95.0%
V ariable Coef f icient S td.E rr. t-S tat. P -value
Intercept 60.159 0.332 181.275 0.000
Afternoon 1.669 0.374 4.468 0.000
Midday 5.542 0.424 13.059 0.000
Morning 5.715 0.373 15.312 0.000
Night -17.140 0.307 -55.832 0.000
Renewables -85.391 1.043 -81.883 0.000
Spring -1.969 0.295 -6.681 0.000
Summer -2.417 0.296 -8.161 0.000
Winter 0.845 0.296 2.856 0.004
Wkend? -10.348 0.236 -43.912 0.000
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Figure 5. 2013 Wholesale Electricity Prices – Histogram and Normal PDF. 
 
 
Figure 6. Current Price PDF vs. 2020 Price PDF with Generator-Specific Marginal Costs. 
 
By comparing the marginal cost of each generator type to the upper-tail of the current and 
2020 price distributions, the likelihood of profitable dispatch was determined (Table 3). As 
wholesale electricity prices decrease, the generators with higher marginal costs have their 
likelihood of dispatch decreased by a greater percentage.  
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Price (€/MWh)
Frequency % Current Prices
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Price (€/MWh)
Current Prices 2020 Prices
Natural GasCoalNuclear
13 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Dispatch Probability Following 2020 Wholesale Price Decrease. 
 Marginal 
Cost 
Current Dispatch 
Probability 
2020 dispatch 
probability 
Decrease in dispatch 
probability 
Renewables 0 N/A (always dispatched due to grid priority) 
Nuclear 12.33 96.0% 87.3% 9.1% 
Coal 38.87 43.8% 22.2% 49.4% 
Natural Gas 64.31 2.4% 0.5% 80.0% 
Discussion  
 As demonstrated by the price shifts observed in Figures 2, 3, and 4, empirical 2013 price 
data demonstrates that average wholesale electricity prices decrease as the amount of electricity 
supplied by renewables increases (EPEX, 2014b; EEX, 2014). The three curves displayed in the 
cumulative supply curve highlight the reason for this shift – because renewables are always used 
due to their grid priority, they sit at the base of the cumulative supply curve (Figure 1). 
Therefore, as their total capacity and production increases, the entire supply curve is shifted 
outward, leading to additional generation capacity that can be produced at a lower marginal cost. 
 These reductions in wholesale electricity price directly impact generators who sell into 
the wholesale electricity market. In order to understand the magnitude of the impact felt by these 
generators, it is important to quantify the price shift that will result from the increased build out 
of renewables. The results from the regressions (Figure 4; Table 1; Table 2) suggest that the 
impact felt by wholesale generators by 2020 will be significant. As the amount of electricity 
supplied by renewables increases by 10% (from 25% to 35%), the subsequent decrease in 
wholesale electricity price of 6.5 €/MWh to 8.5 €/MWh will have a significant impact on the 
economics of market players. Not only will this price decrease result in an annual loss of revenue 
ranging from €2.96 billion to €3.88 billion (17.7% to 23.2% of annual revenue, respectively), but 
it will not impact all generator types equally.  
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 Plants with higher marginal costs will be adversely affected more than plants with 
cheaper marginal costs. This disproportionate effect is tied to the likelihood of dispatch that can 
be predicted based on the comparison of marginal cost to wholesale electricity price. In order for 
a plant to generate profitably, the wholesale price of electricity must exceed the marginal cost to 
generate (with some exceptions relating to start-up and shut-down costs). Therefore, by lowering 
the average price of an approximately normal price distribution, plants with higher marginal cost 
will be able to dispatch disproportionately less than plants with cheaper cost structures. This 
uneven decrease in profitable dispatch is highlighted in Table 3 – natural gas plants are 80.0% 
less likely to dispatch, compared to a 49.4% reduction for coal plants and a 9.1% reduction for 
nuclear plants.  
As natural gas plants are forced to dispatch less frequently, many will be forced to shut 
down. Power plants, such as natural gas plants, require a huge capital expense when they are first 
built. In order for the plant to be profitable to investors, the plant must meet certain capacity 
factors specified in the assumptions made during planning and construction (Peppiatt, 1995). 
Because the dispatch likelihood of natural gas plants will decrease substantially, the capacity 
factor goals will not be met, and many plants will be phased out to prevent further losses. 
Another factor that will contribute to the loss of natural gas plants is the negative price events 
that have become increasingly common in recent years. Negative prices serve as a signaling 
mechanism to fast-ramping plants (e.g., natural gas plants) to go offline (EPEX, 2014a). Plants 
with more cumbersome ramping procedures and costs (e.g., nuclear plants) are better off paying 
money to continue generating electricity than they are incurring the costs of shutting down and 
ramping back up (EPEX, 2014a).  
15 
 
Phasing out of natural gas plants can have a substantial impact on Germany’s electricity 
market as a whole. One notable effect relates to the loss of fast-ramping electricity. Natural gas 
plants, which have relatively fast ramp rates, synergize well with intermittent renewables (IEA, 
2013). Because Germany is continuing to build out intermittent renewables, the total volatility of 
generation will increase over time. Therefore, fast-ramping electricity resources become even 
more essential to maintaining grid stability. If natural gas plants are phased out, grid stability 
could be compromised and Germany will have to use creative infrastructure to prevent an 
increase in outage events.  
Additionally, as a result of a decrease in natural gas plants and capacity, Germany will 
continue to be reliant on coal. In 2013, 45.2% of electricity was generated from coal resources. 
As discussed earlier, the build out of renewables will replace natural gas plants – therefore, coal 
plants will continue to be relied upon. Additionally, coal capacity will likely have to increase to 
compensate for a decrease in generation from nuclear plants as the remaining 9 nuclear plants are 
decommissioned by 2022 (Economist, 2013). This increased reliance on coal will prevent 
Germany from reducing its carbon emissions, thereby negating a positive effect of increased 
renewables. 
The findings of the Master’s Project can readily be transferred to other countries or 
regions that are emulating Germany’s aggressive push for electricity supplied by renewables. A 
number of European countries (e.g., Spain, Denmark) and U.S. states (e.g., California) have built 
out substantial renewable resources and will continue to pursue their own renewable portfolio 
standards (EIA, 2013; Energinet, 2013; CEC, 2014). Similar to Germany, as the total capacity of 
intermittent renewables increases, so too will the generation volatility due to natural fluctuations 
in production. Also, most grid operators give priority to renewables, which means that they 
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always comprise the base segment of the supply curve (Figure 1). As a result, universal to every 
location, an increase in intermittent renewables, holding all else equal, will over time decrease 
wholesale electricity prices because of the interplay between supply and demand.  
For locations with an electricity generation portfolio similar to Germany and feed-in 
tariffs that are financed by ratepayer surcharges, the aforementioned impacts to Germany’s 
electricity grid would be expected to occur. There will be a disconnect in the prices paid by retail 
customers and the prices received by wholesale generators due to the ratepayer surcharge. This 
allows for rising retail prices concurrent with dropping wholesale prices. As a result, both 
ratepayers and wholesale generators are expected to become disenchanted with the methods 
behind supporting the build out of renewables. As evidenced in Germany, many citizens and 
organizations that originally supported aggressive renewables build out began advocating for a 
rework of the Energy Concept (DW, 2013). Political support for a reduction in both the ratepayer 
surcharge and the originally stated renewables targets (35% of electricity by 2020; 80% of 
electricity by 2050) has increased significantly in recent years (Euractiv, 2014).  
As other locations approach penetration of intermittent renewables equal to Germany, 
they should prepare for similar challenges and opposition, or attempt to mitigate them by 
adopting a slower rate of increased renewables penetration and a correspondingly smaller 
ratepayer surcharge. As wholesale electricity prices decrease over time, generators with higher 
marginal costs will be disproportionately affected, as previously discussed in this study (Table 
3). For much of Europe, the marginal costs for natural gas plants are notably higher than for coal 
plants (IEA, 2010). Therefore, much like in Germany, the probability of profitable dispatch will 
decrease significantly for high-cost plants, making them less competitive within electricity 
markets. As a result, natural gas plants throughout Europe will be at risk of phase out, barring 
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any significant reduction in cost structure, such as LNG imports from gas-rich countries like the 
United States (Cunningham, 2014). 
In contrast to Europe, the effect of an aggressive build out of renewables will likely take 
a different course. Although renewables penetration will cause a decrease in wholesale electricity 
prices and an increase in retail prices through financing of feed-in tariffs and other subsidies, the 
United States benefits from an abundance of natural gas. Due to the excess availability of natural 
gas extracted from shale rock, natural gas prices in the United States are much lower than they 
are in Europe (EIA, 2014b). These lower fuel prices translate into a different marginal cost 
structure relative to Europe. After converting currencies, in the United States, marginal costs are 
as follows: 15.01 €/MWh for nuclear, 37.12 €/MWh for coal, and 52.14 €/MWh for natural gas 
(IEA, 2010). Marginal costs for coal are very similar to those demonstrated in Germany (-4.5%); 
although costs for nuclear are much higher in the United States (+21.7%), Germany’s phase-out 
of nuclear plants makes a comparison of the competitiveness of nuclear generators irrelevant; the 
notable difference in cost structure is that costs for natural gas plants are much lower in the 
United States than in Germany (-18.9%) (IEA, 2010). Unlike the commodity coal, natural gas is 
very costly to ship overseas due to the liquefying process (National Geographic, 2014). 
Therefore, natural gas prices do not equilibrate internationally to the same degree as coal prices 
(Charles River Associates, 2014). Because the relative marginal costs of coal and natural gas 
generators in the United States are much more similar than in Germany, natural gas plants will 
not be put at a significant disadvantage in terms of reaching target capacity factors (IEA, 2010). 
Instead, it is likely that the more expensive coal plants and natural gas plants will suffer relative 
to more efficient and cheaper competitor plants, regardless of fuel type. This is beneficial from 
an overall market perspective because coal plants will not automatically out-compete natural gas 
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plants due to their marginal costs. Natural gas plants can remain more competitive and continue 
to provide services that coal plants cannot – fast ramp-rates and lower carbon emissions (IEA, 
2013).  
As a result of these market dynamics, locations such as Germany will experience either 
constant or increasing carbon emissions, while places such as California will be able to reduce 
their carbon emissions over time. The important distinction between these two locations is that in 
Germany, some of the electricity production formerly from natural gas plants will be replaced by 
coal plants. This replacement is ultimately a result of the higher marginal cost of natural gas 
plants and the reduced ability of natural gas plants to dispatch profitably in conjunction with 
decreasing wholesale electricity prices (Figure 6; Table 3). Because the marginal costs for 
natural gas plants and coal plants in California are much closer to parity, efficient natural gas 
plants will still be able to compete as wholesale electricity prices drop due to increased 
penetration of intermittent renewables. Because natural gas plants can emit as little as 44% of the 
CO2 produced by coal plants, keeping a significant amount of natural gas plants in its generation 
portfolio will better enable California to minimize its impact on climate change (Gouw, 2014). 
In addition to the climate-related impacts, the effect of intermittent renewables on 
Germany’s electricity market brings into question the usefulness of subsidy instruments such as 
feed-in tariffs funded through ratepayer surcharges. Although feed-in tariffs spur growth of 
renewables by providing relatively riskless future cash flows, it might prove beneficial to reduce 
the length over which these subsidies are provided (GTM, 2010). If Germany had allowed its 
substantial feed-in tariffs to expire earlier, then retail electricity rates might have risen less and 
specific generator types (natural gas) would not have been put at a competitive disadvantage. 
The downside associated with abandoning these feed-in tariffs earlier would be a slower 
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adoption of renewables, and less ambitious electricity portfolio targets. But for locations 
attempting to learn from Germany’s experiences, a less aggressive build out of intermittent 
renewables may provide a significant benefit via less disruption to existing electricity markets.  
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